431:10-117
Insurance Code
§431:10H-117 Authority to adopt rules. The commissioner may adopt reasonable rules to promote premium adequacy and to protect the policyholder in the event of substantial rate increases, and to establish minimum standards for marketing practices, producer compensation, producer testing, penalties, and reporting practices for long-term care insurance. [L 1999, c 93, pt of §2; am L 2003, c 212, §95]ment thereof; or
(2) Ten or more members, employees, or employees of members of any trade or professional association or of a labor union or of any other association having had an active existence for at least two years where such association or union has a constitution or bylaws and is formed in good faith for purposes other than that of obtaining insurance.
Such persons, with or without their dependents, may be issued the same form of an individual policy varying only as to premium, amounts, and kinds of coverage applied for by such persons under an arrangement whereby the premiums on such policies may be paid to the insurer periodically by the employer, with or without payroll deductions, or by the association for its members, or by some designated person acting on behalf of such employer or association. The term employees as used in this section shall be deemed to include the officers, managers and employees of the employer and the individual proprietor or partners if the employer is an individual proprietor or partnership. No individual may become insured for more than $20,000 under this plan. [L 1987, c 347, pt of §2]equent offenses at the judge’s discretion;
(3) In addition to the fine in paragraph (2), the court shall either:
(A) Suspend the driver’s license of the driver or of the registered owner for:
(i) Three months for the first conviction; and
(ii) One year for any subsequent offense within a five-year period from a previous offense;
provided that the driver or the registered owner shall not be required to obtain proof of financial responsibility pursuant to section 287-20; or
(B) Require the driver or the registered owner to keep a nonrefundable motor vehicle insurance policy in force for six months;
(4) Any person cited under this section shall have an opportunity to present a good faith defense, including but not limited to lack of knowledge or proof of insurance. The general penalty provision of this section shall not apply to:
(A) Any operator of a motor vehicle owned by another person if the operator’s own insurance covers such driving;
(B) Any operator of a motor vehicle owned by that person’s employer during the normal scope of that person’s employment; or
© Any operator of a borrowed motor vehicle if the operator holds a reasonable belief that the subject vehicle is insured;
(5) In the case of multiple convictions for driving without a valid motor vehicle insurance policy within a five-year period from any prior offense, the court, in addition to any other penalty, shall impose the following penalties:
(A) Imprisonment of not more than thirty days;
(B) Suspension or revocation of the motor vehicle registration plates of the vehicle involved;
© Impoundment, or impoundment and sale, of the motor vehicle for the costs of storage and other charges incident to seizure of the vehicle, or any other cost involved pursuant to section 431:10C-301; or
(D) Any combination of those penalties; and
(6) Any violation as provided in subsection (a)(2)(B) shall not be deemed to be a traffic infraction as defined by chapter 291D.
(b) Any person, in the capacity of a licensed or unlicensed motor vehicle insurer, self-insurer, producer, or other representative, who violates any provision of this article shall be assessed a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000 for each violation.
© Any person, in the capacity of a licensed or unlicensed motor vehicle insurer, self-insurer, producer, or other representative, who knowingly violates any provision of this article shall be assessed a civil penalty of not less than $3,000 and not to exceed $10,000 for each violation.
(d) (1) Violations of subsections (b) and © shall be subject to the construction that each repetition of such act shall constitute a separate violation; and
(2) The imposition of any civil penalty under subsection (a), (b), or © shall be in addition to, and shall not in any way limit or affect the application of, any other civil or criminal penalty, or public safety condition or requirement, provided by law. [L 1987, c 347, pt of §2; am L 1988, c 345, §1; am L 1989, c 348, §1; am L 1990, c 167, §1; am L 1993, c 205, §25; am L Sp 1993, c 4, §4; am L 1996, c 20, §1; ree L 1997, c 2, §11 and am c 251, §27; am L 1998, c 231, §2 and c 275, §9; am L 2002, c 155, §69; am L 2006, c 195, §1]
Case Notes
Applies to repeat offenders and to defendants being sentenced at a single proceeding. 751 F. Supp. 1420.
Borrower of a vehicle cannot assert a good-faith defense without at least inquiring of the owner whether or not the vehicle is insured. 71 H. 178, 787 P.2d 214.
Where State conceded that appellant had borrowed uninsured vehicle from a friend, in order to defeat lack of knowledge defense, State was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant actually knew that the vehicle was uninsured at the time appellant was operating it. 78 H. 86, 890 P.2d 673.
As §571-1 mandates against treating juvenile adjudications as convictions, appellate court erred in holding that defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication of driving without no-fault insurance constituted a conviction for purposes of applying the repeat offender sentencing provisions of this section (1993) to defendant’s subsequent offense of driving without no-fault insurance. 92 H. 521, 993 P.2d 555.
Section mandates that an insurer be fined if it violates §431:10C-207 but gives the commissioner some discretion as to the amount of the fine; commissioner’s imposition of $3,000 fine was not an abuse of discretion as it satisfied the statutory requirements. 104 H. 261, 88 P.3d 196.
Certified copy of a person’s traffic abstract is satisfactory evidence to establish the person’s prior no no-fault insurance conviction; State not required to show defendant was counseled at time of prior no no-fault insurance conviction; there was insufficient proof of defendant’s prior conviction to support enhanced sentence for no no-fault insurance offense, where record disclosed no evidence to tie defendant with [person with the same name] of the traffic abstract. 9 H. App. 516, 852 P.2d 476.
Pursuant to §431:10C-117(a)(2) (1992) good faith defense and §431:10C-117(a)(2)© (1992) reasonable belief defense, borrower of a motor vehicle has a statutory right to reasonably believe that borrowed motor vehicle is insured. If one or more relevant facts reasonably required borrower to inquire, borrower then had a duty to inquire until borrower reasonably believed that motor vehicle was insured. 10 H. App. 519, 879 P.2d 566.
It was the “obvious intention” of the legislature to authorize the retroactive application of the part of Act 167, L 1990, that authorized the sentencing court the discretion to impose a sentence of community service instead of a fine. 77 H. 476 (App.), 888 P.2d 376.
Where defendant was sentenced pursuant to subsection (a)(2), because the district court may have been unaware of the applicability of quoted parts of §§706-641 and 706-642 and of its discretionary authority to sentence defendant to perform community service rather than to pay the fine, appellate court vacated the part of the sentence ordering defendant to pay a $1,000 fine and remanded that part for resentencing. 77 H. 476 (App.), 888 P.2d 376.
An officer who has grounds to arrest individual for driving without no-fault insurance is required to issue summons or citation in lieu of physically taking defendant to police station or court. 78 H. 98 (App.), 890 P.2d 685.
When trial court revoked driver’s suspended sentence, it lacked authority to do so where the State, despite knowledge that driver had been arrested for another no-motor-vehicle-insurance charge, did not move to revoke driver’s suspended sentence within the suspended sentence period, and driver was not convicted of the second citation charge until after the suspended sentence period for the first citation had already expired. 106 H. 391 (App.), 105 P.3d 1197.