291C-105

Excessive speeding

§291C-105 Excessive speeding. (a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding:

(1) The applicable state or county speed limit by thirty miles per hour or more; or

(2) Eighty miles per hour or more irrespective of the applicable state or county speed limit.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “the applicable state or county speed limit” means:

(1) The maximum speed limit established by county ordinance;

(2) The maximum speed limit established by official signs placed by the director of transportation on highways under the director’s jurisdiction; or

(3) The maximum speed limit established pursuant to section 291C-104 by the director of transportation or the counties for school zones and construction areas in their respective jurisdictions.

(1) For a first offense not preceded by a prior conviction for an offense under this section in the preceding five years:

(A) A fine of not less than $500 and not more than $1,000;

(B) Thirty-day prompt suspension of license and privilege to operate a vehicle during the suspension period, or the court may impose, in lieu of the thirty-day prompt suspension of license, a minimum fifteen-day prompt suspension of license with absolute prohibition from operating a vehicle and, for the remainder of the thirty-day period, a restriction on the license that allows the person to drive for limited work-related purposes;

(D) A surcharge of $25 to be deposited into the neurotrauma special fund;

(E) May be charged a surcharge of up to $100 to be deposited into the trauma system special fund if the court so orders;

(F) An assessment for driver education pursuant to section 286G-3; and

(G) Either one of the following:

(i) Thirty-six hours of community service work; or

(ii) Not less than forty-eight hours and not more than five days of imprisonment;

(2) For an offense that occurs within five years of a prior conviction for an offense under this section, by:

(A) A fine of not less than $750 and not more than $1,000;

(B) Prompt suspension of license and privilege to operate a vehicle for a period of thirty days with an absolute prohibition from operating a vehicle during the suspension period;

(D) A surcharge of $25 to be deposited into the neurotrauma special fund;

(E) May be charged a surcharge of up to $100 to be deposited into the trauma system special fund if the court so orders;

(F) An assessment for driver education pursuant to section 286G-3; and

(G) Either one of the following:

(i) Not less than one hundred twenty hours of community service work; or

(ii) Not less than five days but not more than fourteen days of imprisonment of which at least forty-eight hours shall be served consecutively; and

(3) For an offense that occurs within five years of two prior convictions for offenses under this section, by:

(A) A fine of $1,000;

(B) Revocation of license and privilege to operate a vehicle for a period of not less than ninety days but not more than one year;

(D) No fewer than ten days but no more than thirty days of imprisonment of which at least forty-eight hours shall be served consecutively;

(E) A surcharge of $25 to be deposited into the neurotrauma special fund;

(F) May be charged a surcharge of up to $100 to be deposited into the trauma system special fund if the court so orders; and

(G) An assessment for driver education pursuant to section 286G-3. [L 2006, c 129, §1; am L 2008, c 231, §16]

Case Notes

Where prosecution did not provide a sufficient foundation for the admission of officer’s testimony regarding the speed reading given by the officer’s laser gun, and no other evidence was admitted at trial indicating the speed that defendant was driving defendant’s motor vehicle, disregarding the officer’s testimony resulted in a record that was devoid of any evidence of the speed that defendant was driving defendant’s motor vehicle; as this material element was not supported by substantial and admissible evidence, defendant’s conviction reversed. 121 H. 204, 216 P.3d 1227 (2009).

There was insufficient evidence in the record to sustain defendant’s conviction under this section for speeding excessively where, given the relatively small margin of error of five miles per hour greater than the threshold established, officer’s testimony that officer’s speedometer appeared to have been operating normally throughout the previous year alone was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the speedometer on officer’s police vehicle was accurate to within five miles per hour on the night of the offense. 122 H. 354, 227 P.3d 520 (2010).

As the offense of driving at an excessive speed under subsection (a) is not a strict liability offense and requires proof that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, the requisite state of mind must be charged in the offense; where the charge against defendant failed to allege the requisite state of mind, judgment vacated and charge dismissed without prejudice. 128 H. 314, 288 P.3d 788 (2012).

Charge of excessive speeding under subsection (a)(1) against petitioner dismissed where the charge did not allege that petitioner acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, thus failing to allege the requisite state of mind. A charge that fails to charge a requisite state of mind cannot be construed reasonably to state an offense and thus the charge was dismissed without prejudice because it violated due process. 130 H. 353, 311 P.3d 676 (2013).

As §291C-161© requires every person convicted under this section to be sentenced in accordance with this section, trial court erred in sentencing defendant to a six-month driver’s license suspension under §286-125; the plain language of this section required the sentencing court to impose the list of sanctions as specific under subsection ©, including a thirty-day license suspension for a first-time offender. 121 H. 117 (App.), 214 P.3d 1107 (2009).